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MacDonald and Rockas: California Law Survey

SURVEY: WOMEN AND
CALIFORNIA LAW
This survey of California law, a regular feature of
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions of special importance to women. A brief
analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised
in each case is provided.
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I. FAMILY LAW
1. California Civil Code section 5125 (d) does not require that

separate family businesses be awarded to the operating
spouse in a marital dissolution action
In re Marriage of Kozen, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 304 (2nd Dist. 1986). In In re Marriage of Kozen, the husband appealed from the trial court's award of a successful fast
food franchise and $105,000 in attorney and accountant fees to
his wife in a marital dissolution action. On appeal the Second
District affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial
court because California Civil Code section 5125 (d) does not require that separate family businesses be granted to the operating spouse.
James and June Kozen separated in 1981 after a thirteen
and one-half year marriage. The marital dissolution proceedings
took place in 1984. At that time June worked solely within the
home for fifteen years. Her previous experience consisted of six
or seven years working as a hairdresser.
Eight years prior to the dissolution action, James entered
into a partnership with Leonard Allenstein to operate Burger
King franchises in Hollywood and Agoura. In a 1984 buyout
agreement between the partners, James received the Hollywood
restaurant, which he operated successfully, and Allenstein took
the Agoura restaurant. The agreement required James to borrow
$227,000 to payoff Allenstein.
At the time of the marital dissolution, community assets
consisted of the Hollywood franchise valued at $1,187,000, the
Burbank franchise worth $363,150, the family residence in Pacific Palisades, valued at approximately $700,000, and various
smaller investments.
The trial court entered an interlocutory judgment in May
1984, awarding the Burbank Burger King to James, dividing the
smaller community assets and ordering James to pay June's accountant and attorney fees totalling $105,000.
In September 1984, the trial court entered its final judgment regarding the community assets. The court awarded the
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Hollywood restaurant to June because a Burger King representative testified that June was an acceptable franchisee because
of the company's management training program. The court required James to fully assume the $227,000 debt acquired in dissolving the Allenstein partnership and awarded him the family
home. June was ordered to pay him $96,620 to balance the property distribution.
The court denied James' motion for reconsideration despite
the fact that he tendered a $394,000 check to June, believing the
court might award the Hollywood restaurant to him and the
family home to June. The court also denied James' motion for a
new trial. He appealed.
On appeal, James contended that the trial court abused its
discretion in: (1) awarding the Hollywood Burger King to June
and the $227,000 debt to him; and (2) requiring him to pay
June's accountant and attorney fees.
James argued that he should have received the Hollywood
Burger King because he had the skills required to run the restaurant and needed the cash flow to service his business debt.
He asserted that June had no business experience. James relied
on California Civil Code section 4800 (b)(1)1 which authorizes
the trial court to divide assets in any way necessary to obtain an
equal division of the community property.
The court of appeal stated that the trial court carefully considered the appropriate distribution of the community assets.
The trial court based its conclusions on: (1) June's need for the
restaurant income to support the couple's three children; (2) evidence establishing that June could run the restaurant as well as
James because he had no special training when he started the
franchise; (3) the couple's inability to reach an acceptable cash
settlement; and (4) the opportunity for June to support the family without relying on support from James because of the bitterness between the parties.
1. California Civil Code § 4800 (b)(1) provides: "Where economic circumstances
warrant, the court may award any asset to one party on such conditions as it deems
proper to effect a substantially equal division of the property." CAL. CN. CODE § 4800
(b)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
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The court further held that the trial court's decision did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. The cases upon which James
relied to support his contention were not controlling. In In re
Marriage of Burlini,2 the court of appeal affirmed an award of a
coin laundry business to the husband because he had the special
skills required to repair the old laundry equipment without
which the company could not survive. In In re Marriage of
Smith,3 the court of appeal held that the family custom signmaking business must be awarded to the husband because the
business required his technical knowledge and his wife performed only clerical tasks. Based on James' description of his
duties in running the Hollywood Burger King, the court found
that June could discharge those duties equally as well once she
was trained by the franchisor. The trial court found and the record supported the fact that no particular expertise is required to
run a Burger King Restaurant franchise.
Furthermore, the court of appeal did not read California
Civil Code section 5125(d)4 as requiring that separate family
businesses be awarded to the operating spouse. Section 5125 (d)
states that a spouse who operates a business that is community
personal property has the sole management and control of that
business. In Goss v. Edwards/> the court of appeal relied on section 5125 (d) to legitimize the wife's voting trust which gave her
former husband the right to vote her shares in a company that
he had established and operated. Here, the court of appeal did
not view the Goss interpretation as requiring that family businesses be awarded to the operating spouse. The court of appeal
also considered James' argument that he needed the business income to service the Allenstein partnership debt to be without
merit James had sufficient means to pay the debt and actually
stated it was proper that he should assume the debt based on
the distribution scheme.
The court also found no abuse of discretion in requiring
2. 143 Cal. App. 3d 65, 191 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1983).
3. 79 Cal. App. 3d 725, 145 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1978).
4. California Civil Code § 5125 (d) provides: "A spouse who is operating or managing a business or an interest in a business which is community personal property has the
sole management and control of the business or interest." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(d)
(West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
5." 68 Cal. App. 3d 264, 137 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1977).
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James to pay June's accountant and attorney fees. On appeal,
James argued that the evidence did not establish that June was
unable to payor that he was better able to pay the fees. James
further argued that the fees were unreasonable. The court of appeal quickly dispensed with both arguments. Extensive testimony at trial established that the fees had reached such large
proportions due to James' lack of cooperation, dilatory tactics
and withdrawal from a settlement. The court of appeal affirmed
the fee award to June.
The result in Kozen is beneficial to women involved in marital dissolution actions for two reasons. First, the decision recognizes that a husband's support payments are neither the only
nor the best way to provide for the wife and children upon dissolution. As here, the wife may be given the opportunity to: (1)
support herself out of the community assets; (2) acquire new
skills through training; and (3) maintain her independence and
dignity without continuing reliance on her husband's support
checks. Second, the difficulty so many women have encountered
in actually obtaining the monthly support checks is alleviated by
allowing the wife to support herself.

Linda S. MacDonald

2. Time basis is proper method to determine community property interest in stock options during marriage and exercisable after options during marriage and exercisable after
separation.
In re Marriage of Harrison, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1216, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 234 (Fourth Dist. 1986). In In re Marriage of Harrison the
California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's use of a timebased formula to allocate community and separate property interests in stock options granted during marriage and exercisable
after separation. 1 On appeal the court further found that the
1. The community interest was calculated by creating a fraction: The total number
of days between the signing or granting of the option agreement and the date of separa·
tion was divided by the total number of days from the signing or granting of the option
agreement and the day on which each portion of the option became fully vested and not
subject to divestment. After reimbursement to the husband for the purchase of the op-
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating spousal
support. However, the court of appeal concluded that the trial
court erred in providing for a step down spousal support award
and in granting husband full credit for repayment of a
preseparation loan.
During the parties five and one half year marriage the husband was granted four options to purchase shares of stock in the
company where he was employed. Of these stock options, one
was qualified and three were nonqualified.2 As of the date of
husband and wife's separation, the qualified stock option was
not fully exercised and the stock purchased under the nonqualified options was not fully vested. 3 At the time of trial, wife did
not offer any evidence of the value of the options. However the
husband had a certified public accountant testify as to the value
of the stock options. In addition there was uncontradicted testimony that the stock options were granted by the employer as
"golden handcuffs" to encourage husband to stay with the company. To establish the wife's share of the stock options the trial
court used a time formula which apportioned the community interest in the stock options as a direct function of the length of
the marriage. The wife appealed the method used by the trial
court to determine the community property interest in the stock
options.
Relying on In re Marriage of Hug,4 the court of appeal in
tion and any taxes paid thereon in connection with the exercise of the option, the community property interest was determined by dividing the fraction into the gain on the
stock option on the date of exercise.
2. The qualified stock option gave husband the right to buy 2,500 shares of nonforfeitable company stock in 25 percent increments on specified dates. The nonqualified
stock options gave the husband the immediate right to purchase 100 percent of the company stock covered by the option. However the stock was subject to forfeiture to the
company if the husband was terminated from his job with cause or if he left without
company consent. The forfeiture provision lapsed in 20 percent increments beginning
two years after the stock was issued.
3. The court of appeal stated that the term "vested" is used in family law cases to
define the point in time when retirement benefits are not subject to forfeiture if the
employment relationship terminates before retirement. The court of appeal concluded
that the husband's rights in the stock purchased under the nonqualified stock options
were analogous to vested pension rights because the stock was subject to forfeiture.
4. 154 Cal. App. 3d 780, 201 Cal. Rptr. 676 (First Dist. 1984) (where community
property interest in unvested rights of employee fringe benefits is substantially related,to
the number of years of employment, the time rule is the appropriate method to allocate
the parties' respective interests in the benefits at time of dissolution).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 4

410 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:408

Harrison held that the trial court's use of the time rule to establish the parties' respective interests in the stock options was
proper. However the Harrison court stated that the denominator
in the trial court's formula was technically incorrect because it
referred to the total numb~r of days from the granting of the
option until the option becomes fully vested. Although husband's rights in the stock purchased pursuant to the nonqualified stock options did not vest until the forfeiture provisions
lapsed, his rights in the options vested on the day that each was
granted. Therefore the denominator would be one and the ratio
defining the community property would exceed 100 percent. The
court of appeal concluded that since the trial court's intention
could be reasonably inferred, the error did not require reversal.
The court corrected the formula by deleting the word "option"
and inserting "[s]tock received pursuant to the exercise of the
option."
The wife argued that the trial court erred in calculating the
community property interest in the stock options based on the
date the options were granted instead of the date that the husband's employment with the company commenced. In Hug the
court of appeal found that the proper date to use was the date
employment commenced because the circumstances involved in
the granting of the stock options indicated that they were
granted as ~ompensation for past rather than future services. 5
The court of appeal in Harrison concluded that there was no
evidence to show that the stock options were used initially to
attract husband to the company or that they were issued as deferred compensation for past services. Thus, the court of appeal
held that the stock options were granted to husband based on
his skill and effort as of the date of granting and therefore there
was a logical basis for using that date in the formula.
The wife alleged that the trial court erred in determining
the tax liability incurred by her husband as a result of purchasing stock through the option agreements. The court of appeal
held that pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 836 the
5. [d. at 790, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 683.

6. Internal Revenue Code section 83(a) provides in pertinent part:
If, in connection with performance' of services, property is
transferred to any person other than the person for whom
such services are performed. . . the amount. . . paid for such
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trial court properly valued the stock as of the date the restrictions were removed.
The wife also argued that the trial court erred in awarding
her cash rather than a proportionate share of stock. The court of
appeal held that the argument was without merit because the
wife specifically requested a cash award at trial. Although the
court of appeal could have dismissed the wife's appeal of the
trial court's disposition of the stock options based on the wife's
acceptance of the benefits of the judgment, the court stated that
they preferred to reach the merits of the case.
The court of appeal found that the trial court erred in relying on In re Marriage of Epstein? to allow husband full reimbursement for paying the balance of a preseparation loan. The
Harrison court concluded that as the stock purchased with the
loan proceeds had a community interest, the husband was only
entitled to a credit for the amount paid on the community obligation. Based on the time formula the court of appeal in Harrison calculated that 55 percent of the stock represented community property and therefore the judgment should be modified to
award wife an additional $9,810.
The wife claimed that the trial court abused its discretion
. by refusing to rule on spousal support, in ordering step down
spousal support, and by terminating jurisdiction over spousal
support.s Since the record showed that the trial court ordered
property, shall be included in the gross income of the person
who performed such services in the first taxable year in which
the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such
property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture . • • •
1.R.C. § 83(a) (1984).
7. 24 Cal. 3d 76, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413, 592 P.2d 1165 (1979) (party using his or her
separate property after separation to pay preexisting community obligations is entitled
to reimbursement).
8. At the order to show cause hearing in October 1979, the trial court ordered the
husband to pay spousal support of $800 a month, wife's medical and dental bills, the
house payment and various other bills related to the family home. The interlocutory
judgment of dissolution continued the $800 monthly support order plus the house payment and medical insurance until August 1981. From August 1981 to May 1982 spousal
support was reduced to $400 a month and the house payment. Medical insurance continued from August 1981 until February 1981 at which time the husband only had to pay
the wife's insurance in excess of $50 monthly. After May 1982 the trial court awarded
$5,000 as an advance of community property for the purpose of assisting the wife. At the
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spousal support to be paid to wife at the order to show cause
hearing and at the interlocutory judgment of dissolution, the
court of appeal concluded that there was no basis to the claini
that the trial court refused to rule on spousal support. The court
of appeal further held that because there was evidence that the
wife was employable, the trial court did not exceed its discretion
by terminating jurisdiction over spousal support. Finally the
court of appeal found that there was no factual basis to justify a
stepdown scheme for spousal support. Accordingly, the court of
appeal modified the judgment to award the wife the difference
between the original amount of support awarded and the
amount that support had been periodically reduced.
This case points to the difficulties that arise upon dissolution when it is necessary to establish the value of employee stock
options that are not exercisable or have not vested. In Harrison
the court of appeal found it to be "inexplicable" that the wife
did not offer any evidence as to the value of the options. Although the trial court is bound to dispose of the community assets equitably, the court need not look beyond the evidence
presented when determining the value of assets that also have a
separate property component. Thus, it appears that it would be
in each party's best interest to pursue all possible methods for
placing a value on the community assets arid to be prepared to
present the burdens and benefits of each calculation at trial~

Kate Blackburn Rockas

3. The state court that issues an initial child custody decree
retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify that decree providing that the child or any of the parties remains
a resident of that state.
In re Marriage of Pedowitz, 179 Cal. App. 3d 992, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (5th Dist. 1986). The court of appeal in In re Marriage
of Pedowitz held that there was insufficient evidence to find that
the husband had remained a California resident so as to convey
April 1983 hearing the trial court terminated jurisdiction to award further spousal
support.
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exclusive continuing jurisdiction over modification of a marital
dissolution/child custody decree of the California Superior
Court.
Neal and Mindy Pedowitz were married in 1977 and resided
in Fresno, California. In 1979 the couple had a child, Aryn. A
marital dissolution was obtained two years later in the Superior
Court of Fresno and the couple received joint custody of Aryn.
Mindy was awarded physical custody. Neal was granted visitation privileges provided he pay all travel expenses for Aryn's visits. Shortly after the dissolution, Mindy and Aryn moved to
Florida where they remained residents. Neal was in Florida from
June 1982 to May 1983 at which time he stayed with Mindy and
Aryn for approximately half of the time. The remainder of the
time he lived by himself. The record did not disclose Neal's state
.
of residence in the interim periods.

In December 1984, Neal filed a petition for modification of
the marital dissolution decree in the Superior Court of Fresno
County. The petition asked the court to require Mindy to pay
one-half of the travel expense for an adult to accompany Aryn
on the airplane for her visitation periods. After a hearing on the
petition for modification the superior court decided that California had exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the matter and ordered the dissolution decree modified in accordance with Neal's
prayer. Mindy appealed from that decision.
During the same time period Mindy filed a petition in a
Florida court to establish and modify the California decree and
to reduce Neal's visitation privileges. The Florida court issued a
decree modifying the California decree as prayed for by Mindy.
Neal's appeal of the Florida decision is still pending.
Both the California and Florida courts knew that proceedings were pending in the other jurisdiction. Under the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdicition Act (UCCJA)
when a child custody proceeding is pending in more than one
state each state must stay its proceeding and communicate with
its sister state in order to determine which state is the more appropriate forum.! Neither the California or Florida court stayed
1. CAL. CIY. CODE §§ 5150 - 5174 (West 1983). FLA. §§61.1301 - 61.1348 (Fla. Stat.
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its proceeding or communicated with the other court as required. The issue presented for determination was whether California or Florida had properly assumed and exercised jurisdiction over the modification proceedings.
The court of appeal held that the record did not disclose
whether Neal had remained a resident of California in order to
establish that California had exclusive continuing jurisdiction to
modify the California decree. The court reversed and remanded
the case for additional evidence regarding Neal's state of
residence.
The court of appeal first analyzed California's leading Supreme Court case on the subject, Kumar v. Superior Court.2 The
facts of Kumar parallel those presented in Pedowitz. In Kumar,
a marriage dissolution was obtained in New York. The wife and
child moved to California while the husband remained a resident
of New York. The wife later petitioned the California court for
modification of provisions of the child custody decree. The trial
court denied the husband's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. On appeal the California Supreme Court
held that deference to another state's continuing jurisdiction
ends if and when the child and all parties have moved away.
Since the husband was still a resident of New York, that state
retained jurisdiction to modify the child custody decree.
The court of appeal then discussed the requirements of the
1983). California Civil Code section 5155 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction.
under this title if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding
concerning the custody of the child was pending in the court
of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this title, unless the proceeding is stayed by the
court of the other state because this state is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons.
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody of the child
was pending in another state before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the
court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that
the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate
forum . . . .
CAL. CIY. CODE §5155 (West 1983). (Florida Statutes section 61.1314 is virtually identical
to the above provisions of the California Civil Code).
2. 32 Cal. 3d 689, 186 Cal. Rptr. 772, 652 P.2d 1003 (1982).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss3/4

12

MacDonald and Rockas: California Law Survey

1987]

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

415

UCCJA. The Act determines when a state court may assume jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding. Its purpose, inter alia
is to avoid just such jurisdictional competition and conflict as
presented in Pedowitz by establishing guidelines for the resolution of jurisdictional disputes. As discussed previously neither
the California nor Florida courts adhered to the UCCJA
requirements.
The court of appeal next examined the Federal Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).3 Congress intended that
the PKPA be applied to all interstate custody disputes. The
Federal Act establishes when a state court may and may not
modify a child custody determination. In general, the PKPA requires that a child custody decree must be modified in the state
that issued the original decree unless the child and all parties
are no longer residents of that state.
The UCCJA basically conforms with the PKPA. In deciding
which Act controls, the court of appeal in Pedowitz was persuaded by out of state authorities that the federal law preempts
the UCCJA. Thus the PKPA must be examined first for the resolution of jurisdictional disputes over child custody proceedings.
Under the PKPA the jurisdiction of a state court which has
made a child custody determination continues as long as that
3. 28 U.S.C.S. §1738A (Cumm. Supp. 1986).
The Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as
provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody
determination made consistently with provisions of this section by a court of another State.
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a
State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if
(2) one of the following conditions is met: (A) such State (i) is
the home State of the child on the date of the commencement
of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home within six
months before the commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant
continues to live in such State.
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made
a child custody determination consistently with the provisions
of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (cHI) of this section continues to be met and such State
remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A (Cumm. Supp. 1986).
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state "[r]emains the residence of the child or of any
contestant. "4
The court stated that the Kumar rule, the PKPA and the
UCCJA all warranted the same conclusion. If Neal had remained
a resident of California, the California court would have continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the modification proceedings because California issued the initial decree. Neal failed to produce
sufficient evidence to establish that he had returned to California after eleven months in Florida, with the intent to continue
his California residency. Neal was unable to establish his continuing relationship with California and thus the California court
could not assume jurisdiction over the modification proceedings.
The court of appeal reversed and remanded for the development of evidence regarding Neal's state of residence. Only when
the child and all parties have terminated their residency in the
state issuing the original decree may another state assume jurisdiction over modification of a child custody decree.
Women who move out of state and whose husbands remain
in California after California has issued a child custody decree
must seek custody decree modifications in this state. Thus the
woman will have to travel to and secure representation in the
state which issues the original child custody decree. The intent
of the PKPA and the UCCJA is to simplify interstate custody
disputes and to avoid competing decisions rendered by courts of
sister states. These rules should facilitate changes in custody decrees and prevent unnecessary and duplicative litigation.

Linda S. MacDonald

4. An award of spousal support may not be based on the parties' pre-marital cohabitation under California Civil Code
section 4801 (a).
In re Marriage of Bukaty, 180 Cal. App. 3d 143, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (4th Dist. 1986). In In re Marriage of Bukaty the
4. [d.
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court of appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the wife's support award upon marriage dissolution, without considering twenty-seven years of the parties' cohabitation. The wife failed to bring a separate civil action
alleging an express or implied contractual obligation of support
based on the parties' many years of cohabitation.
.
The parties were married in 1942 and divorced in 1954.
From 1954 until 1981 they lived together intermittently although the record did not disclose the frequency of their cohabitation during that period. The parties were remarried in 1981,
but their second marriage lasted only a year and a half. Husband and wife separated again in 1982 and in 1984 the trial
court heard the marriage dissolution and support proceeding. At
the time of trial the wife was sixty-four years old. She had been
unemployed for four years due to an unidentified physical disability acquired while working for the state as a switchboard operator. The wife's age and disability severely limited her employment opportunities. The evidence at trial disclosed that the wife
had savings of $20,000, monthly income of $394, and monthly
expenses of $1,135. The husband had assets of $200,000 in trust
deeds, monthly income of $3,302 and monthly expenses of
$2,225.
The trial court awarded the wife $400 per month spousal
support for a period of three years. The wife contended on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding such a
small monthly allowance and in terminating her award payments after three years. The wife argued that in making the
award the trial court should have taken into consideration the
parties' years of cohabitation.
The court of appeal discussed California Civil Code section
4801(a) which establishes the guidelines for fixing the amount
and term of spousal support payments.! The trial court must
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1987). Section 4801(a) states that
in making the award for spousal support, the court shall consider all of the following
circumstances of the respective parties:
(1) The earning capacity of each spouse . • •
(2) The needs of each party.
(3) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each.
(4) The duration of the marriage.
(5) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment ...
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consider, inter alia, the duration of the marriage and the relative needs and abilities of the parties. Under the terms of California Civil Code section 4801(a) cohabitation is not a consideration in awarding spousal support in a marriage dissolution
proceedi!lg.
The wife argued that the trial court failed to consider the
fact that the parties cohabitated in the interim period between
their marriages, establishing a relationship of some forty-two
years. Wife contended that, considered in justice and equity,
this fact rendered the support award inadequate and established
an abuse of discretion. The court of appeal stated that the wife's
failure to bring a separate civil action alleging an express or implied contractual obligation of support covering the period of cohabitation as found in Marvin v. Marvin,2 precluded consideration of this factor. If the wife had brought such an action it
would have been heard in conjunction with the marriage dissolution proceeding. The court determined that its jurisdiction was
limited to consideration of the factors enumerated in California
Civil Code section 4801(a) for the term of the second marriage
only because this was solely a marriage dissolution proceeding.
The wife further argued that the trial court erred in terminating her support after three years. The court of appeal stated
that as a general rule, support payments must be permanent if
the marriage is considered lengthy. Case authority establishes
that a lengthy marriage is one of approximately nine years or
more. 3 Under the facts presented this marriage did not qualify
(6) The age or health of the parties.
(7) The standard of living of the parties.
(8) Any other factors which it deems just and equitable.

Id.
2. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976).
[A]dults who voluntarily live"together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competant as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights.
So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from
enforcing such agreements.
18 Cal. 3d 660, 674, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (1976).
3. See, In re Marriage of Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979) (Nine
years held to be the term of a lengthy marriage). In re Marriage of Vomacka, 36 Cal. 3d
459, 204 Cal. Rptr. 568, 683 P.2d 248 (1984) (Eleven years held to be the term of a
lengthy marriage).
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as a lengthy marriage so as to prevent termination of support.
The wife argued that nevertheless the parties' term of cohabitation was analogous to a lengthy marriage. The court of appeal
reiterated that the period of cohabitation could not be considered under the Family Law Act. 4 The Act specificlUly prescribes
the rights and duties of parties arising from the marital relation.
If the court were to consider a right to support arising from the
period of cohabitation, the purpose of the Family Law Act
would be frustrated because the Act covers the marital relation
only.
The court of appeal recognized that length of marriage is
only one of many factors to be considered in awarding spousal
support. Nonetheless the court considered length of marriage a
substantial factor because it reflects the commitment of the parties and the stability of the marriage. The wife could have
sought further support for the cohabitation period in a Marvin
type action.
.
Finally, the wife contended that the support award was inadequate considering her needs and her husband's resources.
Again the court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion in
setting the wife's support award at $400 per month after consideration of all factors listed in California Civil Code section
4801(a). An abuse of discretion will only be found when an appellate court determines that no judge would have made the
same order under the circumstances. Although the court of appeal recognized that the trial court's determination may be unfair to the wife, there was no basis upon which to find that no
judge would have reached the same determination. This conclusion evidences just how broad the trial court's discretion is in
determining spousal support awards under California Civil Code
section 4801(a). The court of appeal thus affirmed the trial
court's spousal support award of $400 per month for three years.
4. The Family Law Act is codified at CAL. Crv. CODE §§4000 - 5004 (West 1986).
California Civil Code section 4100 states:
Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, to which the consent of the
. parties capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent
alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by the
issuance of a license and solemnization as authorized by this
code ... (emphasis supplied).
[d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987

17

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 4

420

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:416

In an age where many people cohabitate without benefit of
marriage, couples would be well advised to enter into a contract
regarding the disposition of earnings and property acquired during the relationship. Women still earn less than men and frequently cannot sustain the standard of living enjoyed during the
relationship after it has ended. Furthermore, the older the parties to a cohabitative relationship become, the more difficult it
will be for the woman to be self-supporting if the relationship
ends. In this case, the wife may still benefit by bringing a civil
action to determine what support she may be entitled to on an
implied contract theory. In short, parties in a non-marital,
cohabitative relationship are only protected by appropriate financial planning in the event the relationship ends.

Linda S. MacDonald

5. Donor of semen provided directly to a woman for artificial
insemination may be declared the legal father of a child so
conceived.
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr.
530 (First Dist. 1986). In Jhordan C. v. Mary K. the California
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's holding that the semen
donor was the legal father of a child conceived by artificial insemination. I The court of appeal concluded that when a donor's
semen is not obtained from a licensed physician, the mother is
estopped from invoking the nonpaternity provision of California
Civil Code section 7005(b).2 The court of appeal further held
that declaring the donor to be the legal father did not violate the
mother's constitutional rights of equal protection and privacy.
Mary K. wished to conceive a child by artificial insemination and to raise the child with a close female friend, Victoria.
1. Artificial insemination is the introduction of semen of the husband or of another
into the vagina otherwise than through the act of coitus. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
714 (5th ed. 1982).
2. California Civil Code section 7005(b) provides: "The donor of semen provided to
a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of another women other than the
donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived." CAL. ClV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983).
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Mary and Victoria chose Jhordan C. to donate the semen.
Jhordan personally provided Mary with semen and she conceived by artificial insemination. When the child was born, Mary
listed Jhordan as the father on the birth certificate and with her
permission, Jhordan visited the child monthly. After five months
Mary terminated the visits and Jhordan filed an action against
her to establish paternity and visitation rights. Victoria joined as
a party in the litigation seeking joint legal custody with the
mother and visitation rights as a de facto parent of the child.
Mary and Victoria appealed the trial court's order finding
Jhordan to be the legal father and denying Victoria's status as a
de facto parent.
California Civil Code section 7005(b) is derived from the
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).3 In drafting section 7005(b), the
Legislature followed the UPA version verbatim, with one important exception: the word "married" was not used. This omission
provided both married and unmarried women with the statutory
means to have children without the semen donor being able to
assert paternity. Section 7005(b) also gives men the statutory
means to donate sperm without the fear of being held the legal
father.
The court of appeal stated several reasons for holding that
the physician involvement requirement in section 7005(b) is
mandatory rather than directive. Health considerations, such as
a doctor being able to screen a donor for any communicable or
hereditary diseases is one reason. In addition, if there is ever a
question regarding the donor's rights and obligations to a child
born by artificial insemination, a third person may be able to
clarify the original intent of the parties.
Appellants claimed that constitutional principles of equal
protection and privacy require that Mary be afforded the protection of section 7005(b). Mary and Victoria argued that as there
are paternity statutes preventing a donor from asserting actions
against married women, failure to provide the same provisions
for unmarried women is a denial of equal protection. The court
of appeal concluded that the argument failed because married
and unmarried women are not similarly situated for purposes of
3. UNIF. PAR. Af:r § 5, 9A U.L.A. 593 (1973) (adopted in California in 1975).
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equal protection analysis. Citing Estate of Cornelieus/ the court
of appeal stated that public policy mandates that, to preserve
the sanctity of the marital institution, it is necessary to have
statutes which presume that the woman's husband is the father
and to prohibit assertions of paternity by anyone other than her
husband or herself. The court of appeal found that the same
considerations do not apply to unmarried women and thus there
is not a denial of equal protection.
Mary and Victoria also alleged that finding Jhordan to be
the legal father infringed upon their constitutional right to privacy. Based on both parties' conduct the court of appeal concluded that Jhordan was a member of the family unit and therefore declaring him to be the legal father did not violate
appellants' right to family autonomy. The court observed that
during the p"regnancy Jhordan visited Mary and she agreed to
his purchasing baby furniture to be kept in his home. In addition, Mary approved of Jhordan starting a trust fund for the
child.
Appellants further contended that section 7005(b) infringed
upon their constitutional right to procreative choice. The court
of appeal reasoned that the argument was without merit because
the statute did not impose any restrictions on the right to bear a
child.
In support of their claim that Victoria should be declared
the child's de facto parent, appellants relied on Guardianship of
Phillip B .. r. In Phillip B., the court of appeal found that permanent residency with the child was not required to confer de facto
parent status on a couple who cared for a disabled child on
weekends while the child spent the remainder of the week in an
institution. However the court of appeal in Jhordan held that
because Victoria's visitation rights had been legally recognized
by court order it was not necessary to address the issue of her de
facto parent status.
Although appellants were precluded from asserting the non4. 35 Cal. 3d 461, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1984) (conclusive presumption of paternity
under California Evidence Code section 621, subdivision (a) is not a violation of a child's
due process rights).
5. 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
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paternity provision in this case, section 7005(b) has a positive
impact on women in general. In enacting section 7005(b) the
Legislature has sanctioned the conception and raising of children by women without a legal father. Single and lesbian women
benefit in particular because the statute provides them with a
legal means to prohibit assertions of paternity. The countervailing arguments against section 7005(b) are that the physician
involvement requirement may prevent some women from utilizing the nonpaternity provision because they cannot afford the
associated expense or because some doctors may be morally adverse to being a party to the artificial insemination procedure.
Kate Blackburn Rockas

II. CRIMINAL LAW
1.

Conviction for rape with a foreign object upheld because
under the terms of California Penal Code section 289 a finger is a foreign object.

People v. Wilcox, 177 Cal. App. 3d 715, 223 Cal. Rptr. 170
(2d Dist. 1986), modified 178 Cal. App. 3d 682f (1986). In People
v. Wilcox, the court of appeal affirmed defendant's conviction
for rape with a foreign object. The court held that: (1) a finger is
a foreign object within the meaning of Penal Code section 289
and (2) the trier of fact is not compelled to accept the opinion of
an expert witness.
Wilcox was the ex-husband of victim's roommate. He went
to victim's home and engaged her in conversation. Wilcox then
partially undressed her despite her resistance. He inserted his
finger into her vagina and attempted to sexually assault her further. A knock at victim's door enabled her to take refuge in the
bathroom and prevent further attack. Wilcox admitted having
inserted his finger in victim's vagina but argued that victim had
consented until the interruption. Seeking to have his conviction
overturned, Wilcox argued that a finger is not a foreign object
within the meaning of Penal Code section 289.
California Penal Code section 289 prohibits:
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The penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal openings of another person, for the
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse
by any foreign object, substance, instrument or
device when the act is accomplished against the
victim's will by means of force, violence, duress,
menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury. . . .1

Subsection (k) states: "'[f]oreign object, substance, instrument
or device' shall include any part of the body, except a sexual
organ."2
Wilcox sought to prove that a finger is a sexual organ in
order to take his act out of those proscribed by Penal Code section 289. Wilcox offered the expert opinion of a clinical psychologist specializing in sex therapy who testified that almost every
area of the body is a sexual organ, particularly the fingers.
The court rejected this argument because under the explicit
language of the statute foreign object includes any part of the
body other than a sexual organ. Sexual organs are "reproductive
organs."3 The court adopted "penis" or "phallus" as the definition of a male's sexual organ. Wilcox did not use his penis during the act committed upon victim. In the court's modified opinion4 issued a month after the original, the court recognized that
various bodily organs may be used for sexual purposes but they
were not therefore sexual organs./5
The 1978 version of Penal Code section 289 specifically excluded body parts from the meaning of foreign object.6 Under
that version Wilcox could not have been convicted of rape with a
foreign object. The 1982 Amendment specifically construes body
parts as foreign objects. If the meaning of foreign object under
the 1978 version were adopted here, the 1982 Amendment would
be abrogated. The court reviewed the legislative history of the
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(k) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
3. Edwin B. Steen, Dictionary of Biology, at 495 (1971). Alexander B. Spence, PhD.
& Elliott B. Mason, PhD., Human Anatomy & Physiology, at 755 (1979).
4. 178 Cal. App. 3d 682f.

5.Id.
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289 (West 1970). Under the former version of California Penal Code section 289 a foreign object does "not include any parts of the body." Id.
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1982 Amendment to Penal Code section 289. The Assembly
Committee's digest stated that foreign objects include parts of
hands or entire fists. Thus, the California Legislature intended
to prohibit the forcible penetration of fingers into genital and
anal cavities by amending Penal Code section 289 in 1982.
The People did not present expert testimony to refute that
many body parts are sexual organs. Wilson contended that his
conviction could not stand because his expert's testimony was
uncontradicted. The court held that the trier of fact is not compelled to accept the expert's opinion if doubt exists as to the
basis of that opinion. The judge or jury are free to analyze the
foundation of the expert's opinion and to determine whether or
not it is meritorious. Here the trier of fact rejected the conclusion of Wilcox's expert witness.
In upholding defendant's conviction for rape with a foreign
object the court of appeal has accomplished two things. First,
the court has adhered to the language of the statute and the
intent of the legislature. Second, the court has protected women
by recognizing that the forcible penetration of genital and anal
openings by any means is a serious invasion of individual integrity and ought, in good conscience, to give rise to a prosecutorial
right.

Linda S. MacDonald

2. Under the 1980 amendments to Penal Code section 261 the
state does not need to establish that a rape victim resisted
the assailant in order to obtain a rape conviction.
People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 721
P.2d 110 (1986). In People v. Barnes, the California Supreme
Court reversed the First District Court of Appeal, which upheld
defendant's conviction for rape and false imprisonment. The supreme court held that the court of appeal committed reversible
error by relying on the pre-1980 version of Penal Code section
261. 1 Section 261 was amended by the California Legislature in
1. California Penal Code section 261 provided in pertinent part:
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1980. 2 Defendant's trial took place in 1982. The 1980 version of
section 261 contained no references to the victim's resistance as
a necessary element for a rape conviction.
The events in question occurred on the night of May 27,
1982. At approximately 10:00 p.m. defendant Barnes telephoned
the victim, Marsha M., and invited her to his home. Marsha and
Barnes had been neighbors and acquaintances for four years.
Each had been to the other's home once prior to May 27th.
Barnes telephoned Marsha twice more and she finally
agreed to go because she wanted to buy a small amount of marijuana from him. She arrived at his home around 1:00 a.m. and
Barnes was waiting outside for her. He invited her in to smoke
some marijuana and at first Marsha refused, stating that she
had to get up early and just wanted to pick up some marijuana.
Nonetheless, Barnes persuaded Marsha to accompany him inside. They entered the house through an iron gate at the front
door and then down a hall to 'a staircase leading to a room off of
the garage.
After ten or fifteen minutes of talking and smoking marijuana Barnes began to hug Marsha but she pushed him away.
Although Marsha told him she just wanted to get the marijuana
and leave, he continued his advances. When Marsha left the
house Barnes angrily followed her out. When they got to the
iron gate Barnes began to scream at Marsha. She asked him to
open the iron gate because she didn't know how to open it, but
Barnes "reared back" as if he were going to hit her. Marsha became nervous, and the two continued to argue for about twenty
minutes. Finally Barnes agreed to open the gate but said that
first he had to go back inside the house to put on his shoes. Mar"Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of
the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances: (2) Where a person resists,
but the person's resistance is overcome by force or violence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261
(West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
2. The amended version of California Penal Code section 261 provides in pertinent
part:
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances: (2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1987).
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sha followed him back into the house.
While putting his shoes on Barnes began to threaten Marsha. He grabbed her by the collar of her sweater and stated that
he could pick her up with one hand and throw her out. He began
to tell her of his sexual exploits and stated that he could make
her do anything he wanted.
Barnes then ordered Marsha to remove her clothes. Marsha
refused. He proceeded to make threatening gestures which induced Marsha to comply. They then engaged in sexual intercourse for about an hour and both fell asleep.
At about 4:00 a.m. Marsha woke Barnes and coaxed him
into opening the iron gate for her. She went directly home and
phoned a hospital. She was examined and tested that day for
venereal disease and was told by hospital personnel she could
wait several days to report the incident to the police.
Marsha called the police the following day. Her initial hesitation was based on her fear that the police would not believe
her. Barnes was later tried for rape and false imprisonment, and
convicted.
On appeal, the First District reversed the trial court's conviction. The Court of Appeal applied the pre-1980 version of section 261 which required evidence of the victim's resistance under
subdivision 2 as a necessary element for conviction. The Barnes
court of appeal relied on the interpretation of section 261 (1970)
found in People v. Nash: 3
The offense of rape is committed when the victim
resists the act, but her resistance is overcome by
force or violence. Although she must resist in fact,
an extraordinary resistance is not required. The
amount of resistance need only be such as to
manifest her refusal to consent to the act.·

The court of appeal then reviewed the record for evidence
of Marsha's resistance and Barnes' threats. The court deter3. 261 Cal. App. 2d 216, 67 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1968).
4. Id., at 224, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 625.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 4

,428 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:425

mined that: (1) defendant did not threaten physical violence
against Marsha to make her succumb to sexual intercourse; (2)
Marsha acquiesed to defendant's demands without protesting;
(3) defendant would not have perpetrated the sexual act if Marsha had resisted and; (4) Marsha only claimed to have resisted
because she failed to communicate her resistance to defendant.
In short, the evidence was insufficient to convict Barnes of rape
under the pre-1980 version of Penal Code section 261.
The California Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
elucidate the requirements for a rape conviction under Penal
Code section 261 (2) as amended in 1980 by the California Legislature. The supreme court held that the 1980 version of section
261 was controlling because Barnes was tried in 1982. Subdivision 2 of the 1980 version does not require evidence of the victim's resistance or of defendant's threats in order to obtain a
conviction for rape.
Barnes contended that the 1980 amendments did not
change the substance of section 261 because resistance was never
required to obtain a rape conviction. The supreme court rejected
this argument stating that a victim's resistance was a critical
factor in a prosecution for rape by force or violence. The Court
noted that the crime of rape was established by a victim who
failed to consent and showed resistance but whose will was overborne by force or violence. Despite Barnes' urging, the Supreme
Court stated that although evidence of resistance goes directly
to the issue of the victim's consent, when the legislature removed "resists" and "resistance" from section 261 in 1980 they
intended to make a substantial change in the code provision.
The supreme court referred to the Legislative Digest and
the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice's analysis of the
code's am~ndment to determine the legislative intent. From
these sources the supreme court found that the purpose of the
amendment was to abolish the requirement that a rape victim
resist her assailant in order to establish the crime. Studies have
proven that victims who resist a rapist are twice as likely to be
physically injured in the attack. Other studies show that prosecutors are less likely to bring charges against an alleged rapist if
the victim has not resisted. Based on this information the supreme court stated that the specific purpose of the 1980 amend-
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ments was to eliminate the requirement of resistance in order to
obtain a rape conviction. Furthermore, this change has affected
the fact finding process in a rape trial. Revisions to jury instructions now reflect that the victim is not required to resist the rapist on a charge of rape by force or violence.
I)

The Supreme Court went on to note that the 1980 amendments wrought significant change on rape laws from a historical
perspective. At common law a woman was expected to exhibit
"utmost resistance" throughout the attack in order to overcome
the presumption of consent. Furthermore a woman's character
was put in issue and evidence regarding her chastity was adduced at trial. Prosecutors viewed claims of rape as inherently
suspect. Resistance served as an objective indicator of nonconsent while failure to resist implied consent. Thus, resistance corroborated the rape claim.
The Supreme Court mentioned recent studies which show
that many women freeze in the face of sexual assault, becoming
helpless because they are terror-stricken. Active resistance
doubles the chance that a victim will be physically injured during the assault.6
Thus, the 1980 amendments to section 261 allow the victim
to choose whether or not to resist the assailant and a conviction
is not precluded by failure to resist. In sum, the Supreme Court
determined that the purposes of the 1980 amendments to section 261 were to eliminate resistance as a prerequisite to a rape
conviction and to alleviate the victim's need to substantiate a
5. California Jury Instruction No. 10.00 provides in pertinent part: "The crime of
rape as charged against the defendant in this case is an act of s'e,xual intercourse with a
female person not the wife of the perpetrator, without her consent, when she resists and
her resistance is overcome by force or violence."
CALJIC No. 10.00 (1979 rev.).
California Jury Instruction No. 10.00 provides in pertinent part:
In order to prove the commission of the crime of rape by
means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury, each of the following elements must be proved: 1. That
the defendant engaged in an act of intercourse with a person
[and] 4a. That the act was accomplished by means of force or
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.
CALJIC No. 10.00 (1982 rev.).
6. Symonds, The Rape Victim, Psychological Patterns of Response, 36 AM. J. PSyCHOANALYSIS 27, 29-33 (1976). Note, Elimination of the Resistance Requirement and
Other Rape Law Reforms: The New York Experience, 47 ALB. L. REV. 871 (1983).
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forcible rape claim through resistance. The court also stated that
according to People v. Salazar,7 it is improper to instruct the
jury that it must find that the victim resisted in order to return
a guilty verdict or for the court to rely on a lack of resistance to
find the evidence insufficient for a rape conviction. Thus, the
court of appeal erred in reversing Barnes' conviction ·using the
pre-1980 version of section 261 which contained references to
the victim's resistance.
The supreme court went on to analyze whether the application of the amended version of section 261 compelled a reversal
of the appellate court decision. According the appropriate deference to the fact-finder, if substantial evidence supports the jury
verdict, that decision must stand. Referring to People v. Thornton,S the court emphasized that the trial judge or jury has exclusive authority to determine the credibility of witnesses and the
truth of the matters presented.
Applying the requirements of section 261 as amended, the
jury determined that an act of sexual intercourse was accomplished against Marsha's will by means of force, violence or fear
of immediate and unlawful bodily injury. In reviewing the facts
stated previously, the supreme court held that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Barnes' rape conviction. The appellate court's reliance on the pre-1980 version of
section 261 was erroneous because the amended version eliminates the need for a rape victim to resist the assailant. The supreme court pointed out however, that according to People v.
Bermudez,9 the reviewing court must still look to the assailant's
threats and their likelihood to induce fear in the victim when
analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence in a rape conviction
appeal.
The· Supreme Court's decision in Barnes serves to clarify
the requirements to establish rape by force or violence under
7. 144 Cal. App. 3d 799, 193 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1983).
8. 11 Cal. 3d 738, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267 (1974).
9. 157 Cal. App. 3d 619, 203 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1984).
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Penal Code section 261. Although new ground is not forged, the
decision buttresses the provisions of the code and clarifies the
reasons for its amendment in 1980.
Under section 261 rape victims no longer need to physically
resist their attacker in order to prove they have in fact been
raped. Thus, they need not take their lives into their own hands
and risk being maimed or killed. Futhermore, feelings of guilt
for not resisting are lessened because the victim's resistance is
not in issue at trial. The fact that a rape victim experiences fear,
even unreasonable fear, is sufficient to establish the crime of
rape under section 261.

Linda S. MacDonald

3. Multiple rapes committed on the same victim at different
locations may not be separate occasions for the purpose of
imposing consecutive sentences.
People v. Craft,41 Cal. 3d 554,224 Cal. Rptr. 626, 715 P.2d
585 (1986). In People v. Craft the California Supreme Court
held that the phrase "separate occasions" as used in Penal Code
section 667.6(d)/ which imposes mandatory consecutive
sentences for certain sex crimes, applies only to offenses against
the same victim when the perpetrator temporarily lost or abandoned the opportunity to continue his attack. The court found
that defendant never lost or abandoned the opportunity to rape
the victim and therefore, full, separate, and consecutive sentencing under section 667.6(d) could not be imposed. The court further held that sentencing could not be upheld under Penal Code
section 667.6(c),2 which gives the court discretionary power to
1. California Penal Code section 667.6 (d) provides in pertinent part:
A full, separate, and consecutive term shall be served for
each violation of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261, Section
264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 289, or of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286
or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury . • . if the crimes involve separate
victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(d) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
2. California Penal Code section 667.6(c) provides in pertinent part:
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order consecutive terms for some sex crimes, because the trial
court did not state the reasons nor the authority for imposing
consecutive sentences.
Defendant first raped the victim in a drive-in restaurant
parking lot. Defendant then ordered the victim into the back
seat of her car. Defendant drove the victim's car for about one
hour, then stopped and raped her again. Defendant resumed
driving and continued for approximately ninety minutes, stopping once in the interim to lock the victim in the trunk of the
car and once for an unknown reason. At the end of this time
period, he stopped and raped the victim a third time. At trial
defendant was convicted of three counts of rapes and sentenced
to three full, separate, and consecutive terms.
On appeal, defendant argued that his sentence could not
stand if the trial court sentenced him under either subdivision
(c) or subdivision (d) of section 667.6. Relying on People v.
Smith,4 the Craft court agreed that if defendant was sentenced
under subdivision (c) it was error because the trial court failed
to state the reasons or authority for imposing consecutive
sentences. The court stated that the question of whether defendant's sentence under subdivision (d) was proper turned on
whether the rapes occurred on separate occasions.
In People v. Davisr, the California Supreme Court stated
In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation
of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 289, or of committing sodomy
. or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a by force,
violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury ... whether or not the crimes were committed
during a single transaction.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
3. California Penal Code section 261(2) defines rape as "[a]n act of sexual inter. course, accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator ... where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the person or another." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West 1986
& Supp. 1987).
4. 155 Cal. App. 3d 539, 202 Cal. Rptr. 259 (First Dist. 1984) (when the court
sentences under subdivision (c) of section 667.6 it must state the reason for imposing
consecutive sentences and for sentencing under this provision rather than under Penal
Code section 1170.1(a».
5. 29 Cal. 3d 814, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186 (1981) (where the statute is
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that when interpreting ambiguous provisions of a statute the
court "[s]hould ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to
effectuate the purpose of the law."6 In People v. Black,7 the California Supreme Court held that when determining legislative
intent, the court should look to the words used in the statute
apply their ordinary and generally accepted meaning. The supreme court in Black also stated that a court should consider
the context of the entire statute when construing the meaning of
one section.
The court in Craft relied on these principles Of statutory
construction to determine the meaning of "separate occasions"
as used in section 667.6(d). Examining the language in the section, the court found that "occasion" was subject to several interpretations. Defined narrowly, "occasion" means "[a] particular time at which something takes place"; defined broadly, it
means "a period of time in which an opportunity of some kind
exists."8
To clarify the ambiguity as to which definition of "occasion"
should be applied to subdivision (d), the court looked at section
667.6 in its entirety to establish the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute. The court found that since subdivision (c) gives
the court the discretion to impose consecutive sentences for multiple sex offenses while subdivision (d) mandates consecutive
sentences, the Legislature intended to punish some offenders
more harshly than others. The court concluded that the Legislature used the words "separate occasions" in subdivision (d) to
single out those sex offenders who deserve an automatic imposition of consecutive terms.
In order to establish the situations in which the court must
unclear as to whether minors are exempt from the sentence of life iniprisonmEmt without
the possibility of parole the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature when
construing the ambiguity).
6. ld. at 828, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 529, 633 P.2d at 194.
7. 32 Cal. 3d I, 184 Cal. Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104 (1982) (when determining whether
the Legislature intended the word "minor" as used in the second sentence of Welfare
and Institutions Code section 707.2 to refer to the time when the crime was committed
or the time of sentencing, the court should look at the words themselves and keep in
mind the purpose of the statute).
8. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1560 (3d ed. 1961).
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impose consecutive sentences on a multiple sex offender the
Craft court fo~d that "occasions" must be construed narrowly
to mean a period of time in which an opportunity exists. Since
each offense committed by a multiple sex offender occurs at a
distinct point in time, the court concluded that if the statutory
phrase was defined broadly it would be very difficult to distinguish offenders who merely assault someone several times on a
single occasion from one who commits crimes against a single
victim on separate occasions. Therefore the court held that subdivision (d) only applied to offenses against the same victim
when the perpetrator lost or abandoned the opportunity to continue his attack.
Under the narrow interpretation of "separate occasion" the
California Supreme Court held that although defendant raped
the victim three times in three different locations, the offenses
all constituted a single occasion because defendant never lost or
abandoned his opportunity to rape the victim. Thus, the court
concluded that defendant could not be sentenced to full, separate, and consecutive sentences under subdivision (d).
Based upon their conclusion that sentencing could not
stand under either subdivision (c) or subdivision (d) the California Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court fO,r resentencing. The court held that since their holding only related
to sentencing and would not require any retrials it would have a
full retroactive effect. The court further suggested that when
trial judges impose sentences under subdivisfon (d) they should
also state the sentence they would have imposed under (c) and
provide a statement of reasons for such sentencing. The court
concluded that this would prevent needless appeals where the
trial court arguably misconstrued the offenses as occurring on
separate occasions but would have had the discretion to impose
the same sentence under subdivision (c).
As a result of the narrow definition applied by the court to
the words "separate occasions" as used in section 667.7 (d) it
will be very difficult for prosecutors to plead and prove that full,
separate, and consecutive terms should be automatically imposed against a defendant. This is especially true for multiple
rape convictions where the prosecutor must prove as an element
of the crime that the victim did not consent to any of the acts of
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sexual intercourse with the defendant. At the same time, in order to impose mandatory consecutive sentences for multiple
rapes, the prosecutor must show that between each act of sexual
intercourse the defendant did in fact lose or abandon his opportunity to rape the victim. It is difficult to imagine a situation
where a prosecutor would succeed in showing that the victim did
not consent to any of the rapes while proving that the defendant
lost or abandoned his opportunity to rape the victim. The two
concepts are inconsistent with each other. Thus, it is not likely
that persons convicted of multiple rapes against the same victim
will be subject to consecutive sentences unless the trial court
chooses to impose such sentences under its discretionary
authority.

Kate Blackburn Rockas

III. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
1.

Male-only membership policy is arbitrary sex discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 219
Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985). In Iibister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz,
Inc., the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
finding that the male-only membership policy of the Boys' Club
of Santa Cruz, Inc. (Boys' Club) violated the Unruh Civil Rights
Act (Unruh Act).l The court found that the Legislature intended
the Unruh Act to govern places of public accommodation and
because the Boys' Club fell within this category, it was within
the scope of the Unruh Act. The court also held that admitting
girls to the Boys' Club would not contravene the purpose of the
organization because there was no evidence that any of the programs or facilities were unsuitable for use by girls. In addition,
the court stated that there was no proof that female membership would cause serious or permanent danger to the Boys'
1. California Civil Code section 51 provides in pertinent part: "[a]U persons within
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex ... are
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West

1982).
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Club's funding sources or with its relationship with the national
organization. The court specifically limited the holding to the instant case based on the particular nature and function of the
Boys' Club. The court further stated that its findings did not
preclude the legislature from amending the Unruh Act to allow
the Boys' Club to maintain its male-only membership policy.
The Boys' Club of Santa Cruz is a private, nonprofit organization which is affiliated with the Boys' Club of America, a congressionally chartered organization. 2 Approximately half of the
funding- for the Boys' Club of Santa Cruz comes from a gift in
trust donated by John T. and Ruth M. Mallery. The trial court
found that the Mallery Trust was not restricted to use for boys.
The remaining funds come from the United Way, local fund
raisers and private donations.
For an annual membership fee of $3.25, boys between the
ages of eight and eighteen may use the Boys' Club's recreational
facilities which include a gymnasium, an indoor swimming pool,
craft and game areas, and a snack bar. There is not another facility in the area that offers the same range of recreational activities at a comparable cost for either boys or girls. In 1977 several
girls were denied membership in the Boys' Club solely on the
basis of their sex. The girls brought an action against the Boys'
Club seeking an injunction and declaratory relief. The trial court
found that the Boys' Club's membership policy violated the Unruh Act and permanently enjoined the organization from denying membership or access to its facilities to girls. Defendant
appealed.
In 1897 California adopted its first statute prohibiting arbitrary discrimination in places of public accommodation or
amusement. 3 Since the statute specifically listed certain facilities
falling within its scope, lower appellate courts relied on the prin2. United States Code Annotated section 691 provides in part: "The following persons . . . and their successors, are created and declared to be a body corporate of the
District of Columbia, where its legal domicile shall be, by the name of the Boys' Clubs of
.
America ...." 36 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West 1968).
3. The Act of March 13, 1897, ch. 108, s 1, 1897 Cal. Stat. 137, (repealed 1959)
provides that: "All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the
full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants,
hotels, eating-houses, barber-shops, bath-houses, theaters, skating rinks, and all other
places of public accommodation ...." Id.
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ciple of ejusdem generis" to limit the reach of the law:~ In response to a concern that the courts were construing the 1897
statute amendments too strictly, the Legislature enacted the
Unruh Act in 1959.
The Isbister court relied on several California Supreme
Court decisions in defining the scope of the Unruh Act. In
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn.,6 the supreme court
held that the Legislature intended the phrase "business establishment of every kind whatsoever" to encompass all of the
places specifically enumerated in the original drafting of the Unruh Act.'1 The supreme court in Burks v. Poppy Construction
Co.,s stated that "business establishment" also included those
facilities subject to the original 1897 statute, i.e., places of public
accommodation or amusement. The Isbister court further found
that other jurisdictions with statutes similar to California's
equal access laws have used the term "public accommodation"
to cover organizations like the Boys' Club.9
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (3d ed. 1961) provides:
In the construction of laws, wills and other instruments,
the "ejusdem generis rule" is that where general words follow
an enumeration of persons or things • . • such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the same general
kind or class as those specifically enumerated.
[d.

5. The lower appellate courts relied on the principle of ejusdem generis to hold that
only thpse facilities specifically enumerated in the 1897 statute and subsequent amendments could not arbitrarily discriminate. See, e.g., Reed v. Hollywood Professional
School, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 890, 338 P.2d 633 (1959)(private school not covered);
Long v. Mountain View Cemetary Assn., 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 329, 278 P.2d 945
(1955)(private cemetary not covered).
6. 33 Cal. 3d 790,191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427 (1983)(condominium owners association is a business establishment under the Unruh Act and cannot arbitrarily discriminate against buyers on the basis of age).
7. The original version of the bill extended its antidiscriminatory provisions to "all
public or private groups, organizations, associations, business establishments, schools,
and public facilities ...." Cal. A.B. 594 (1959).
8. 57 Cal. 2d 463, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313 (1962)(construction company engaged in the business of selling tract homes operated a business establishment within the
scope of the Unruh Act).
9. As an example the court pointed to New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination
which bars sexual bias in "places of public accommodation"; these places are defined to
include "places of amusement." In National Org. for W., Essex Ch. V. Little L. Base.,
Inc., 127 N.J.Super 522, 318 A.2d 33 (1974), the New Jersey Courts held that a local
Little League was a place of amusement covered by the antidiscrimination statute.
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Relying on these principles, the court in Isbister held that
the Boys' Club is a place of public accommodation or amusement and therefore a business establishment within the scope of
the Unruh Act. In reaching this conclusion the court stated that
because the Boys' Club's primary function was to offer recreational facilities to boys, it clearly qualified as a place of amusement. In addition, the court found that the Boys' Club was unquestionably public because it opened its doors to all boys of the
requisite age. Finally, the court concluded that the members'
lack of control over the organization's affairs and the nominal
membership fee were characteristic of a public accommodation.
The Boys' Club, its amici and Justice Mosk in his dissent
contended that the term "business establishment" only applied
to commercial or profit seeking ventures. Since the Boys' Club
does not collect substantial fees nor does it have any economic
function, the Boys' Club and Justice Mosk concluded that the
organization was not a business establishment and therefore not
governed by the Unruh Act. In support of their argument they
relied on a statement made in Burks ,that defined business as a
"calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for the purpose of
making a liyelihood or gain."lo
The Isbister court rejected this argument. The court stated
that when the Burks' definition of business was viewed in its
entirety, its meaning became clear and provided no support for
the Boys' Club's view. Secondly, in O'Connor, the supreme court
held that a nonprofit organization could indeed come within the
scope of the Unruh Act and thus profit seeking is not the sole
criteria for, determining whether an organization is a business establishment. Also, the Isbister court found that since the Unruh
Act governed places of public accommodation or amusement,
additional attributes were not necessary to conclude that the
Boys' Club was a business.
The Boys' Club and its amici also argued that since nonprofit groups were specifically excluded from California statutes
10. 57 Cal. 2d at 468, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612, 370 P.2d at 316 (1962). The entire sentence reads: "The word 'business' embraces everything about which one can be employed, and it is often synonymous with calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for the
purpose of making a livelihood or gain." Id.
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banning discrimination in housing and employment,11 the Legislature demonstrated an intent to apply a strictly commercial
meaning to the phrase "business establishment" as used in the
Unruh Act. Relying on a statement made in Marina Point, Ltd.
v. Wolfson I2 that the Fair Employment and Housing Act specifically provided that nothing in the statute shall be construed as
limiting or restricting the application of the Unruh Act, the
court in Isbister held that the Boys' Club's claim was without
merit. IS
The Boys' Club further contended that forcing them to admit female members would infringe upon the current male member's rights of association as guaranteed by the state and federal
constitutions. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,14 the United
States Supreme Court held that a Minnesota statute prohibiting
sex-segregated membership. policies by the Jaycees did not violate First Amendment associational rights. Due to the Jaycees'
character as a large, socially unselective membership institution,
the court in Roberts concluded that the organization was beyond
the constitutional protection of intimate association. As to the
Jaycees' rights of expressive association, the Roberts court
stated that the statute in question was not aimed at protected
speech, but rather at satisfying a compelling state interest - redressing historical discrimination against women - and therefore there was no interference with constitutional rights. Finding
that the same reasoning applied to the instant case, the Isbister
court concluded that admitting female members to the Boys'
Club would not violate any male member's rights guaranteed by
the federal constitution.
Although the California Constitution affords greater expres- .
sive and associational rights in some cases than its federal coun11. California Government Code section 12926b(c) provides that the "[phrase]
'[e]mployer' does not include a religious association or corporation not organized for private profit." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1987). Section 12927(d) of
the California Government Code states that the "[term] '[h]ousing accommodation' shall
not include any accommodations operated by a ... charitable association or corporation
not organized or operated for private profit ...." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12927(d) (West
1980).
12. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115 (1982) (landlord's no-children
policy violated the Unruh Act).
13. [d. at 731, n.5, 180 Cal. Rptr. 502, n.5, 640 P.2d at 121, n.5.
14. 104 S.Ct. 3244 (1984).
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terpart, the Isbister court found that given the state's sensitivity
to sexual discrimination, there was no basis to find that a statutory requirement .of equal access to the Boys' Club would offend
constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs asserted that the Legislature intended those types
of discrimination specifically set forth in the Unruh Act be
deemed unreasonable per se. In In re Cox/ 5 the California Supreme Court held that the list was illustrative rather than dispositive. Relying on additional arguments made in Marina that
when amending the Unruh Act in 1974 to add a specific reference to sexual discrimination the Legislature did not intend to
give it any special status, the court in Isbister reaffirmed the
Cox holding and dismissed plaintiffs' argument.
In Marina the supreme court left open the possibility that
the Unruh Act might not apply to discrimination of an entire
class if there was a showing of a need for specialized facilities.
For example, the Marina court stated that the unique physical
and psychological needs of the elderly might justify a housing
facility reserved solely for their use. Since the Boys' Club failed
to show that the organization fulfilled any special needs of males
that females did not have, the Isbister court concluded that the
Boys' Club did not fall within the Marina exception.
The Boys' Club contended that its primary function was to
combat delinquency among the male youth population of Santa
Cruz. Although they conceded that delinquency also affects females, the Boys' Club argued that it had an absolute right to
choose to only focus on the needs of boys. However, the court
found that because there are no other recreational facilities
available to girls in the area, the effect of denying membership
to girls may create a greater delinquency problem than the one
the Boys' Club was trying to alleviate.
The Boys' Club further claimed that since the national organization's purpose is "[t]o promote the health, social, educational, vocational, and character development of boys .. .,m6
prohibiting the Boys' Club's male-only membership policy vio15. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992 (1970).
16. 36 U.S.C.A. § 693 (West 1968).
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lated the supremacy clause of the federal constitution. The Isbister court stated that in Perez v. Campbell I7 the United States
Supreme Court held that state remedial legislation is preempted
only if it "[s]tands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," and
the congressional intent to preempt must be "unambiguous".18
Looking to the language of the charter itself, which gives the
Boys' Club the power "to adopt, amend, and alter a constitution
and bylaws not inconsistent with the laws of the United States
or any State in which the corporation is to operate ... ," the
court found that the reference to boys was merely a passive recognition of the Boys' Club's then traditional character.I9 Thus,
the court concluded that Congress did not intend the phrase
"boys" to be interpreted as having a preemptive purpose.
The court also rejected the Boys' Club's argument that they
should be allowed to deny access to girls because the organization had traditionally served only boys. The Isbister court found
that there was evidence that a number of other Boys' Clubs affiliated with the Boys' Club of America, including some in California, have admitted girls with no ill effects.
Finally, the Boys' Club suggested that its funding would be
jeopardized if its membership policies were changed. Based on
the trial court's finding that the Mallery Trust was unrestricted
with respect to gender, the court in Isbister concluded that the
Boys' Club's primary source of funding would not be endangered. In addition, the court stated that there .was no evidence
to indicate that admitting girls would not produce new sources
of revenue for the organization.
In concluding, Justice Grodin stated that the findings of the
majority were compelled by the Legislature's broad anti-discrimination policy. However, the court expressly limited the holding
to the instant case and stated that their findings did not preclude the Legislature from amending the Unruh Act to allow the
17. 402 u.s. 637 (1971) (a provision in Ariz. Rev. Stat. s 28·U63(B) which provides
that a discharge in bankruptcy shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the
requirements in said statute, is in direct conflict with section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act
and is thus unconstitutional as violative of the supremacy clause).
18. [d. at 649·650.
19. 35 U.S.C.A. § 694(5)(West 1968).
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Boys' Club to maintain its male-only membership policy.
Chief Justice Bird wrote a concurring opinion for the primary purpose of reproducing passages of the dissenting opinion
written by Justice Poche in the California Court of Appeal.
Chief Justice Bird stated that Justice Poche's opinion was important because he pointed out that a finding that the Boys'
Club was not governed by the Unruh Act could mean that services from nonprofit organizations such as the Salvation Army
lunch lines might be restricted on the basis of race, sex, religion
or any ?ther arbitrary classification. 20
In his dissent, Justice Mosk was highly critical of the majority's finding that the Legislature intended the Unruh Act to be
all-encompassing. Justice Mosk contended that if the Legislature had wanted the Unruh Act to apply to nonprofit and charitable organizations such as the Boys' Club, it would not have
used the word "business" in the statute.
Justice Mosk also faulted the majority's ·reliance on Roberts.
He concluded that the United States Supreme Court in Roberts
held that the Jaycees were subject to state-imposed sex restrictions because of the organization's commercial nature. As the
Boys' Club is not engaged in commercial activity, Justice Mosk
(ound that the "instant case was distinguishable from Roberts
and thus, the club should not be subject to interference by the
State.
In his dissent, Justice Kaus 21 conceded that facilities such
as the Boys' Club are covered by the Unruh Act but he concluded that the majority erred in holding that the exclusion of
20. In his opinion Justice Poche made the poignant observation that:
The trial court understood the clear meaning of the Unruh Act Civil Rights Act: community services regardless of
their source are to be provided in accordance with the legislative mandate of equal treatment for all. Perhaps the violation
would have been clearer if the Boys' Club of Santa Cruz had
discriminated on the basis of race, not sex. But that lack of
clarity is not the fault of the language of the statute. Instead,
the difficulty is the long and well ingrained tradition of
women's dependency which even today causes statutory recognition of the equality of women to have an unreal ring to it.
21. Justice Kaus is a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under
assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
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girls was unreasonable and arbitrary. Justice Kaus stated that if
one of the Boys' Club's goals is to control juvenile delinquency
and if most serious delinquents are in fact boys, then the Boys'
Club had demonstrated a compelling need to maintain single sex
facilities. Justice Kaus argued that the fact that there were not
any other comparable facilities for girls was irrelevant to the legal issue before the court.
If organizations such as the Boys' Club are allowed to discriminate on the basis of sex, then there is no reason why other
private organizations which are open to the public cannot arbitrarily discriminate on the basis of sex, race or religion. To prevent this from happening the California Supreme Court in Isbister has made it clear that "business establishment" will be
broadly construed by the courts unless the Legislature takes
steps to amend the Unruh Act to prevent such broad application. Given the Legislature's demonstrated goal of eradicating
arbitrary discrimination, it is not likely that the Legislature will
interfere with the court's liberal construction of the Unruh Act.

Kate Blackburn Rockas

2. Male-only membership policy of Rotary clubs is arbitrary
sexual discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights
Act.
Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary International, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (2nd Dist.
1986). In Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary
International, the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's holding that Rotary International and local Rotary clubs
were private organizations outside the scope of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act, l which prohibits arbitrary discrimination by business establishments. The court of appeal concluded that the international organization and the local clubs were businesses
1. California Civil Code section 51 provides in pertinent part: "All persons within
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex . . . are
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West
1982).
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within the meaning of the statute and therfore the male-only
membership policy of Rotary International was arbitrary sexual
discrimination prohibited by law.
The constitution and bylaws of Rotary International (International), a nonprofit corporate association of local clubs, limits
membership in Rotary clubs to men. Local club membership is
restricted to a certain number of men from each type of business
or profession within the community.
To meet membership growth goals, the local Rotary Club of
Duarte (Duarte) admitted three women members in 1977. International consequently revoked Duarte's charter and terminated
the local club's membership with the international organization.
Duarte and two of the women members brought an action for
injunctive and declaratory relief against the Board of Directors
of International, the trial court found for the defendant.
In Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.,2 the California
Supreme Court held that the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh
Act) did not govern "truly private" relationships. The Isbister
court defined truly private relationships as those that are "continuous, personal, and social [and which] take place more or less
outside public view."3 Since International is a worldwide organization with more than 19,800 member clubs and a membership
turnover rate as high as 20 percent, the court of appeal concluded that Rotarian membership could not be considered truly,
private.

The California Supreme Court in O'Conner v. Village Green
Owners Assn. 4 stated that the California Legislature intended
the phrase "business establishment" to be construed as broadly
as reasonably possible. In O'Conner, the court held that a nonprofit homeowners' association which rendered business services
was a business establishment within the Unruh Act.
Relying on the legal principles confirmed in Curran v.
Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts 5 and Isbister6 the
2.
3.
4.
5.

40 Cal. 3d 72, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212 (1985).
ld. at 84, fn. 14, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 158, fn. 14, 707 P.2d at 220, fn. 14.
33 Cal. 3d 790, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427 (1983).
147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1984) (Boy Scouts' organization exhibits
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court of appeal concluded that International's complex organizational structure and vast number of employees were characteristic of a business establishment within the meaning of the Unruh
Act. Based on testimony that local club members obtained both
commercial advantages and business benefits from their Rotarian membership, the court of appeal found that Duarte was also
a business under the Unruh Act. As such, both organizations
may not discriminate on the basis of sex.
Defendant contended that a court ruling forcing International to accept women members in California is prohibit~d because the judgment would negatively impact upon the organization worldwide. The court of appeal found that there was no
validity to the argument. Regardless, the court of appeal held
that acts of sex discrimination in violation of the Unruh Act
would not be tolerated.
Defendant also argued that the Unruh Act unconstitutionally infringes on International's right to freedom of intimate and
expressive association. Noting that this constitution right is generally afforded to highly personal relationships, the court of appeal concluded that the Rotarian policy of encouraging a widely
diverse membership body precluded the organization from qualifying for such constitutional protection. The court added that if
the Unruh Act infringed upon the organization's right to freedom of expressive association, the interference would be justified
by the State's compelling interest in abolishing sex discrimination by businesses.
The court of appeal found that the trial court erred in concluding that because International is incorporated in illinois,
plaintiffs had to show why the validity of the organization's
membership policy should not be tested under Illinois law. The
court of appeal stated that neither the full faith and credit
clause of the Federal Constitution nor the principle of interstate
comity prevented a California court from enforcing the Unruh
Act against a corporation operating in California.
sufficient business attributes to be classified as a business establishment within the scope
of the Unruh Act}.
6. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 81, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 152, 707 P.2d at 217 (Boys' Club of
Santa Cruz is a business under the Unruh Act).
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The court of appeal further held that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying plaintiffs relief based on the unclean
hands theory. The trial court held that since Duarte had admitted women in violation of Internationars membership policy the
plaintiffs had unclean hands and were precluded from seeking
injunctive relief. The court of appeal concluded that to deny
plaintiffs relief under this theory would be contrary to public
policy and therefore the unclean hands doctrine was not applicable to the instant case.
The court of appeal held that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief and damages. In Koire v. Metro Car Wash,7 the
California Supreme Court found that in enacting the Unruh Act,
the Legislature established a policy that arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses is per se injurious and that minimum statutory damages shall be awarded for every violation of the Unruh
Act as provided for under California Civil Code section 52.8 The
Koire court further held that injunctive relief is an additional
remedy available to aggrieved parties under the Unruh Act.
The Rotary court's decision reconfirms the public policy
mandate of California that men and women are to be treated
equally. To further support the abolition of sex discrimination it
appears that California courts are willing to liberally construe
the term "business establishment" and to find that an organization comes within the Unruh Act. The Leglislature's and court's
firm stance against sex discrimination is paramount in eroding
the male-only policies of many clubs and organization.

Kate Blackburn Rockas

7. 40 Cal. 3d 24, 219 Cal. Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195 (1985).
8. California Civil Code section 52(a) provides in pertinent part:
[W]hoever makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction
on account of sex ... contrary to the provisions of section 51
or 51.5, is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages, and such amount as may be determined by a jury, or a
court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times
the amount of actual damange but in no case less than two
hundred fifty dollars ($250) . . . .n
CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West 1982).
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IV. TORT LAW
1.

The state is not liable for the sexual assault of a traveler
at a highway rest stop when there is no causal connection
between the claimed dangerous condition and the harm
incurred on the premises.

Constance B. v. State, 178 Cal. App. 3d 200, 223 Cal. Rptr.
645 (3rd Dist. 1986). In Constance B. v. State, the California
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment. The court held that the facts presented were insufficient to establish a cause of action for personal injury resulting
from a dangerous condition of property. Further, it declined to
hold the state liable for personal injuries incurred on stateowned property.
While traveling late at night on Interstate 5, plaintiff
stopped at the Dunnigan rest area to use the restroom. l The rest
stop is a state-owned facility located in a grove of eucalyptus
trees. Plaintiff parked her car in the lot and walked the fifteen
yards to the restroom building. As she approached the building
she saw her assailant standing at the northeast corner staring at
her. Another woman exited the building as plaintiff entered.
When plaintiff emerged from the first stall her assailant was in
the women's restroom. The assailant viciously attacked and beat
her, and sexually assaulted her. Another motorist heard plaintiff's screams, witnessed the assailant leave the restroom and
noted the license plate number of his car as he drove away. The
assailant was subsequently convicted of rape and sentenced to
state prison.
Plaintiff brought this civil action against the state, alleging
that due to the dangerous condition of the rest stop the state
was liable for the injuries she suffered as a result of the assault.
California Civil Code section 830(a) defines a dangerous condition of property as: "[a] condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant)
1. The Dunnigan rest area was built in 1967 or 1968. The State Department of Architecture designed the facility. The south half of the building is the men's restroom and
the north half is the women's restroom. The entrance to the women's restroom is located
at the northwest corner of the building. There are no lights betweeti the parking lot and
the building but the outside walls of the facility are well lit.
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risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used
with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable
that it will be used."2
Liability of a public entity is established by statute. Under
California Government Code section 8353 a public entity may be
held liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its
property if a plaintiff can establish that the condition was the
proximate cause of his or her injuries. Here, plaintiff needed to
establish that the physical condition of the Dunnigan rest stop
was the proximate cause of her sexual assault and that an assault of this nature was foreseeable.
Plaintiff offered the declaration of a security consultant that
said the following factors created a dangerous condition of the
property: 1) the restroom was too far from the parking lot to
provide adequate surveillance by other users; 2) the restroom
side entrances blocked the visibility of other users; 3) the location of the bulletin board near the men's restroom distracted attention from the women's restroom; 4) the placement of the facility :five feet below grade surrounded by trees obscured a clear
view of the building; and 5) the placement of the lights and trees
cast heavy shadows at night. Despite this testimony, the court of
appeal stated that the material"facts presented during the summary judgment proceedings did not evidence a dangerous condition of property at the rest stop.
Nonetheless, in support of this contention, plaintiff relied
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830(a) (West 1980).
3. California Government Code § 835 provides:
Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for
injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the
plaintiff establishes that that property was in a dangerous
condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous
condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of
injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) A negligent or
wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity
within the scope of his employment created the dangerous
condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive
notice of the dangerous condition under section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
CAL" GOV'T CODE § 835 (West 1980).
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on Peterson v. San Francisco Community College District:' In
Peterson, California Supreme Court held that the defendant
public entity was liable to an injured plaintiff for harm occasioned by untrimmed foliage next to a parking lot stairway. The
foliage provided a hiding place for criminal assailants. The
causal connection between the attack and the harm was established by the defendant having occasioned the harm.
The plaintiff also cited Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital/' which established the rule regarding a landlord's duty of
care to prevent assaults on tenants. In Isaacs, the California Supreme Court stated that the duty of care arises from the special
relationship that exists between a landlord and an invitee. 6 The
duty to exercise a higher degree of care than reasonable care is
contingent upon whether the landlord could reasonably anticipate that criminal conduct would occur on the premises.
Further, past incidents of criminal conduct on the property
are relevant. Here, plaintiff produced evidence that two daytime
thefts had occurred at the Dunnigan rest stop but assaults similar to that perpetrated upon plaintiff had not occurred.
The state argued that absent previous similar incidents, the
conduct of plaintiff's assailant was unfor.eseeable. Therefore, de4. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 685 P.2d 1193 (1984).
5. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 (1985).
6. According to the Second Restatement of Torts section 332:
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business
visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or
remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for
which the land is held open to the public.
Comment a. Invitees are limited to those persons who
enter or remain on land upon an invitation which carries with it an implied representation, assurance, or understanding that reasonable care has been used to prepare the premises, and make them safe for their
reception.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
The Second Restatement of Torts section 341A states:
A possessor of land is subject to liability to his invitees for
physical harm caused to them by his failure to carry on his
activities with reasonable care for their safety if, but only if,
he should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341A (1965).
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fendant was not under a duty to protect against such conduct.
The Court of Appeal did not agree that assaults at highway
rest stops were unforeseeable. It recognized that rest stops are
open twenty-four hours a day and that all types of people, including criminals, utilize the highways. It was therefore predictable that criminals may commit crimes while traveling. The
court stated that the security of innocent travelers was a responsibility of the appropriate state authorities. Nonetheless, in order to recover, plaintiff was required to prove that a causal relationship existed between the alleged dangerous condition and
the kind of injury incurred.
.
By granting the state's motion for summary judgment, however, the trial and appellate courts decided as a matter of law
that the material facts show a lack of causality. The court of
appeal reviewed a variety of cases to find the appropriate standard to permit the court to take the issues of breach of duty and
causality from the jury.'1 The court is entitled to take the matter
from the jury when the evidence would not warrant it reaching a
verdict. 8 Furthermore, to permit the jury to find that a condition
is dangerous requires sufficient evidence to establish a substantial, as opposed to a possible, risk of injury.9 The court of appeal
also stated that the harm incurred must be of a kind that can be
caused by the claimed dangerous condition in order to establish
liability. The five conditions plaintiff tendered as the cause of
her sexual assault were then examined.
First, plaintiff argued that the restroom building was too far
from the parking lot to provide adequate surveillance by other
users. The court of appeal determined that no reasonable trier of
fact could decide that the state's failure to remedy the distance
between the lot and the restrooms constituted a breach of the
duty of care. Thus the fifteen yard distance between the two did
not amount to a dangerous condition of the property.
Plaintiff next argued that the side entrances to the
7. See Starr v. Mooslin, 14 Cal. App. 3d 988, 92 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1971); Pfeifer v.
County of San Joaquin, 67 Cal. 2d 177, 60 Cal. Rptr. 493, 430 P.2d 51 (1967); Barrett v.
City of Claremont, 41 Cal. 2d 70, 256 P.2d 977 (1953).
8. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65 (1948).
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.2 Law Revision Commission Comment (West 1980).
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restrooms blocked the visibility of other users and therefore provided an opportunity for assailants to enter the building unnoticed. The court rejected this argument by characterizing side
entrances as a latent condition that a reasonable landlord would
not perceive as creating a substantial risk of injury. The court of
appeal distinguished Peterson10 noting that the side doors had
not been used previously as part of an assailant's modus
operandi.
Third, the court found the location of the bulletin board
and the fact that the facility was five feet below grade insubstantial factors and could not reasonably be found to increase
the risk of criminal activity. Hence, neither constituted a dangerous condition of the property.
Finally, the court of appeal considered whether the placement of the lights and trees which allegedly cast heavy shadows
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff argued
that the shadows allowed an assailant to conceal himself and to
enter the women's restroom unobserved. The court of appeal rejected this argument as unreasonable speculation, construing it
as a theory of mood lighting. The court of appeal reasoned that
if liability were predicated on the affect of the quantity of light
on an assailant's psychological propensity to commit crime, then
proprietors would become the insurers of public safety. As a
matter of policy, the court of appeal was unwilling to impose
liability on innocent landowners on that basis. In short, the
court of appeal held that the lighting at the Dunnigan rest stop
was not a proximate cause of the sexual assault on plaintiff.
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Sims
pointed out that the state did not adequately deal with plaintiff's contention regarding inadequate lighting in its motion for
summary judgment. He felt the court overstepped its boundaries
by resolving this issue in favor of the state, considering the
state's failure to address it in its moving papers.
The state relied on the Peterson l l holding that there must
be .prior similar incidents to establish liability. Mter the grant of
10. 36 Cal. 3d 799. 205 Cal. Rptr. 842. 685 P.2d 1193 (1984).
11.ld.
'
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summary judgment in Constance B., however, the California Supreme Court reviewed Peterson and determined that prior similar incidents were only one element of foreseeability and not determinative for the imposition of liability. Moreover, in both
Peterson12 and Isaacs,13 the California Supreme Court decided
that inadequate lighting could constitute a dangerous condition
of property. According to Justice Sims, these decisions abrogate
the trial court's ruling that the state is not liable as a matter of
law for inadequate lighting.
The trial court relied on the account of the incident found
in plaintiff's police report. Plaintiff stated that she saw her assailant staring at her as she approached the restroom. From this,
the trial COUI:t inferred that the assailant was standing in the
light, or conversely, not concealed in shadow. Therefore, the trial
court concluded that the adequacy of light at the Dunnigan rest
stop was not subject to reasonable dispute. Justice Sims considered this determination erroneous because plaintiff provided evidence that'the rest stop lighting failed to meet nationally recognized standards and the state failed to address this contention.
The fact that plaintiff saw her assailant prior to the attack did
not in itself resolve the issue of whether the Dunnigan rest stop
was in a dangerous condition due to inadequate lighting. Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no issue of material fact to be tried. Nonetheless the trial court summarily decided the lighting issue and deprived plaintiff of her opportunity
to present the case to a jury.
It is difficult to determine why the trial and appellate courts
were so anxious to dispense with this case. Summary judgment
is a drastic remedy and essentially deprives a plaintiff of his or
her day in court. This decision will likely affect recovery in tort
for assaults that occur in state parks and recreation areas as well
as highway rest stops. The state is California's largest landowner. If recovery were allowed here, a potentially massive increase in tort litigation arising from dangerous conditions of
state-owned property could result. It seems that the court was
not willing to expose the state to that much liability.
12. 36 Cal. 3d at 812, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 849, 685 P.2d at 1200.
13. 38 Cal. 3d at 130, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 365, 695 P.2d at 662.
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In addition, the court may have viewed plaintiff's lighting
theory as too speculative to warrant extended consideration. If
the placement of buildings, benches, sidewalks and lamp posts
on on state-owned property could be legally challenged, then
every walking, jogging, bicycle and other accident would create
potential state liability. Regardless of the court's true motivations, the implications of this decision are potentially far
reaching.

Linda S. MacDonald

2. Independent injuries resulting from the same negligent act
constitute separate causes of action in medical malpractice

claims.
Zambrano v. Dorough, 179 Cal. App. 3d 169, 224 Cal. Rptr.
323 (Fourth Dist. 1986). In Zambrano v. Dorough the California
Court of Appeal held that the statute of limitations did not bar
Linda Zambrano (Linda) and her husband, Arthur Zambrano
(Arthur) from filing a claim of medical malpractice arising out of
a doctor's erroneous diagnosis made more than a year before.1
The court of appeal found that plaintiffs' claims were for injuries independent from those incurred at the time of defendant's
misdiagnosis and therefore constituted a separate cause of action falling within the prescribed time period for filing claims.
Linda first saw Milford Dorough, M.D., as a patient in January 1977, five days after she had a copper seven LU.D.2 removed in a hospital emergency room because she was experienc1. California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 provides in part:
In an action for injury or death against a health care provider
based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, the
time for commencement of action shall be three years after
the date of injury or one year after the date of injury or one
year after the plaintiff discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs
first.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982).
2. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 386 (5th ed. 1982) (intrauterine devices (IUD)
are pieces of plastic or metal of various shapes (e.g., coil, loop, bow inserted into the
uterous to exert a contraceptive effect».
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ing abdominal pain and vaginal bleeding. Dr. Dorough diagnosed
Linda's continuted pain as stemming from a miscarriage of an
undetected pregnancy. Dr. Dorough admitted Linda into Hoag
Hospital where he performed a dilation and curettage. 3 Two
weeks after Linda was discharged from the hospital, she returned to Dr. Dorough's office complaining of severe abdominal
and rectal pain, and he rehospitalized her. This time she was
admitted to the University of California at Irvine Medical
Center because she had no insurance coverage. He performed
exploratory surgery during which he discovered a ruptured
ectopic pregnancy;' Several days after the surgery, Dr. Dorough
told Linda's mother that he had initially misdiagnosed Linda's
condition.
In May 1979 Terrel Bond, M.D., informed Linda that she
needed a complete hysterectomy. At that time Dr. Bond indicated to Linda that there was possibly a connection between the
ruptured ectopic pregnancy and the condition requiring the hysterectomy. Linda testified that until she spoke with Dr. Bond
she was not aware that Dr. Dorough's misdiagnosis could be related to her reproductive system problems. Two weeks after
meeting with Dr. Bond Linda filed a complaint against Dr.
Dorough and Hoag Hospital for medical malpractice seeking
general and punitive damages. Linda's husband also filed a claim
against the defendants for loss of consortium. The trial court
dismissed plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that the one year
statute of limitations attached in January 1977 and therefore the
parties were barred from filing a complaint in August 1979.
The court of appeal found that the applicable statute of
limitations was California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5
which provides that a medical malpractice action shall be commenced one year after the plaintiff learns of or should have
learned of the injury. The court of appeal stated that the word
injury as used in section 340.5 referred to the damaging effect of
the wrongful act and not the act itself. As a result of Dr.
Dorough's misdiagnosis and his alleged subsequent refusal to
treat Linda as a patient, the plaintiffs suffered emotional dis3. ld. at 397 (dilation of the cervix and curettement of the endometrium).
4. ld. at 1133 (a ruptured ectopic pregnancy occurs when an impregnated ovum develops outside the cavity of the uterus).
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tress. Since a complete hysterectomy would permanently deprive
Linda of her reproductive capacity, the court of appeal concluded that this was a loss significanctly different than the earlier transitory damages and therefore consitituted a separate
injury.
The traditional view prohibits splitting a cause of action in
medical malpractice claims. As articulated in Sonbergh v. MacQuarrie/' the general rule is that all damages resulting from an
injury constitute a single cause of action. However in MartinezFerrer v. Richardson-Merrell,6 the court of appeal departed
from the Sonbergh rule and held that the independent injuries
plaintiff suffered as a result of taking a particular medication
comprised several causes of action. The court of appeal in Martinez-Ferrer concluded that to deny plaintiff access to the courts
for failure to comply with the statute of limitations would be a
miscarriage of justice.
Relying on Martinez-Ferrer, the court of appeal in Zambrano held that Linda's injuries constituted two separate causes
of action. Therefore, since the plaintiffs filed their complaint
against defendants two months after learning of Linda's need for
a hysterectomy the statute of limitations had been met.
The Zambrano holding is important because the court of
appeal clarified the subtle distinction between splitting a cause
of action and establishing separate causes of action. This is significant in medical malpractice claims where injuries sometimes
do not manifest themselves until after the statute of limitations
for filing a complaint has run. It appears that California courts

5. 112 Cal. App. 2d 771, 247 P.2d 133 (Second Dist. 1952) (a cause of action in tort
arises when the wrongful act is committed and ignorance of the existence of the injuries
will not prevent the running of the statute of limitations).
6. 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (Second Dist. 1980) (the statute of limitations did not bar an action against the manufacturer of a particular medication ~here
plaintiff developed cataracts sixteen years after taking the medication).
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are not willing to deny a plaintiff his or her day in court when to
do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.

Kate Blackburn Rockas
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